As edge computing attains tremendous popularity, IoT devices always outsource their data to nearby edge servers for storing and pre-processing, which improves the efficiency of data processing and reduces the required network resources. For privacy-preserving, sensitive data is mostly encrypted before outsourcing. Nevertheless, large volumes of data in edge computing usually comes from multiple data sources, which means that they are encrypted with different secret keys, making it difficult for edge server to query and process. Existing solutions are mostly proposed for this problem in cloud computing, but they do not take into account that the limitations of computing and storage capabilities of edge devices will prevent them from performing computationally expensive operations. In this paper, we propose a lightweight privacy-preserving equality query scheme (LPEQ) in edge computing for the first time, which allows authorized users to perform equality query efficiently and privately on the encrypted data outsourced by multiple IoT devices. We also introduce a formal security model and prove that the LPEQ meets secure requirements against curious entities under this model. Meanwhile, our theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations demonstrate that the LPEQ performs better efficiency in terms of computation and communication while retaining privacy-preserving properties. Therefore, it is practical for applications in edge computing.
house is vacant. However, edge servers near the data are not always fully trusted. When these private sensitive data are calculated by the semi-trusted edge server, i.e., it will perform the calculation correctly but be curious about the data owner's private sensitive data, the data privacy issues of this scenario need to be considered urgently.
To tackle this, a straightforward approach is to encrypt the sensitive data before outsourcing it to the edge server. However, there are always multiple data sources in edge computing. In the case of multiple data owners, since each data owner has its own secret key, after encrypting the data with their respective keys and then outsourcing to the edge server, it is very challenging for the edge server to query over the data encrypted with different secret keys. The proposal of the proxy re-encryption mechanism [13] solves this problem well. It utilizes a proxy key, converts ciphertexts for one key into ciphertexts for another one without knowing anything about the plaintexts. It enables the data stored on the edge server to be encrypted under the same key, allowing the ciphertexts to be compared and queried even in the multi-owner scenarios. Many researchers are devoted to the research of proxy re-encryption to better solve data query problems in multi-owner scenarios [14] - [16] , but most of their solutions are applicable to cloud computing, without considering the limitations of computing and storage capabilities of edge devices in edge computing. There have not been comprehensive lightweight and privacy-preserving query protocols designed for edge computing specifically. An efficient and secure query scheme for multi-source encrypted data in edge computing remains to be explored.
A. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss some works related to privacy-preserving query processing for encrypted data.
Many researchers studied the Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) technique to implement the query for outsourced encrypted data. Previously, solutions were mostly proposed for a single user scenario [17] - [19] , i.e., the data is encrypted by a single key.
In order to be better applied in practice, in recent years, many researchers have proposed the query processing scheme for encrypted data in a multi-user scenario. In 2011, Dong et al. [20] proposed a proxy re-encryption scheme based on ElGamal encryption system. They pointed out that at the same level of security, ElGamal-based proxy re-encryption/decryption operations are more efficient than RSA-based operations because the parameters used in ElGamal are shorter than those in RSA. However, their technique is relatively slow for running multiple arithmetic operations on both the user and the proxy. In 2015, Hang et al. [21] introduced a security system called ENKI that performs relational operations from users with different access rights. In their scheme, data owners divide their relationships into multiple virtual relationships, use the proxy to rewrite queries, and use different encryption keys to re-encrypt data to enhance the access control. Sepehri et al. [22] considered a multi-data owner scenario where each data owner outsources its own encrypted data to the cloud server that other authorized users are able to share. Their solution is based on ElGamal cryptography, which does not rely on any interactive computing algorithms and is secure against collusion, because the key is actually shared by the proxy and the authorized user who performs the query. In 2016, Zhang et al. [23] proposed a secure multi-keyword search protocol in the multi-owner model. The method was innovative in functionality since it also realized the rank of the search results. However, this method is proposed for cloud computing, which depends on bilinear pairings and it is not suitable for edge devices with weak computing power.
In order to improve efficiency, Li et al. [24] proposed a proxy re-encryption scheme based on elliptic curve group without calculating bilinear pairing, but still needs to calculate several exponential operations in group. Sepehri et al. [25] proposed a proxy-based protocol for data sharing on the cloud by using an efficient proxy re-encryption based on ElGamal Elliptic Curve cryptosystem. They improved the computing efficiency, however, the communication overhead between the cloud and the proxy is expensive. Lara-Nino et al. [26] proposed a survey of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in the context of lightweight cryptography. They defined, for the first time, the concept and requirements for elliptic curve lightweight cryptography, summarized and compared the main features of some lightweight protocols. Among them, Diro et al. [27] first proposed a novel encryption scheme for fog-to-things communication by using lightweight encryption.
In addition, other researchers also studied some related works about the privacy-preserving query for IoT data. Mahdikhani and Lu [28] presented a new privacy-preserving multi dot-product query scheme, which enables the control center to gain k dot-product results simultaneously in one query. Yekta and Lu [29] employed a new private information retrieval technique which can preserve the privacy for both the end user and the service provider in IoT query services. Lu [30] designed a communication efficient privacy-preserving range query scheme for Fog-enhanced IoT, they adopted the BGN Homomorphic Encryption and converted the range query from an array to a matrix in order to improve the communication efficiency. These researches have well enriched the data query types for IoT data. Nevertheless, they allow the fog server to see the plaintext data of IoT devices, they mainly focused on the privacy protection of the query token and query results. Beyond that, Guo et al. studied secure range search scheme and secure K Nearest Neighbor(KNN) search scheme for encrypted data from IoT devices [31] , [32] . They did a lot for the protection of data privacy. However, much computation was done by cloud servers in their model and this was not suitable for edge device with limited computing power. We still need to construct lightweight algorithms to be better applied in edge computing. The differences between our LPEQ and previous works are summarized in TABLE 1. Our method possesses all the important desired functionalities compared to existing schemes. Some difficult problem assumptions include: Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDH), l-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion Assumption (l-BDHI), Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DBDH), Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH), Elliptic Curve Decisional Deffie-Hellman Assumption (ECDDH), SubGroup Decision Assumption (SDA) and Higher-Order Residue Class Problem (HORC).
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we focus on the research of efficient and secure query scheme for multi-source encrypted data. To the best of our knowledge, we construct the first lightweight privacy-preserving equality query scheme in edge computing. Assume that there are n IoT Devices D = {D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n }, each D i has some sensed data (m, v), where m is a searchable attribute and v is its corresponding value. We consider an equality query as ''how an authorized user can query the set of v satisfying m = w''. Specifically, our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) Aiming at the efficient and secure query problem for multi-source encrypted data in edge computing, we propose a lightweight privacy privacy-preserving equality query scheme, namely LPEQ, in which the authorized users can perform privacy-preserving equality query on the encrypted data outsourced by multiple IoT Devices in edge computing. 2) We specifically design a tuple of algorithms for the scheme by exploiting Elliptic Curve ElGamal Encryption, which performs efficiently in computation and communication. Moreover, we introduce a formal security model and provide detailed security proofs of our scheme.
3) We provide theoretical analyses and conduct exper-
imental evaluations compared with other previous schemes, the results demonstrate that our scheme performs better efficiency in computation and communication while retaining privacy-preserving properties, is practical for applications in edge computing.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as below. Section II gives an overview of the preliminaries used in this paper. Section III presents the system model as well as the security model of LPEQ. In section IV, we describe the detailed construction of LPEQ. Section V provides the security proofs of LPEQ in detail. Section VI gives the theoretical analysis and experimental evaluations of LPEQ in terms of functionalities, computation cost and communication cost. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is given in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
The notion of elliptic curve groups was independently suggested by Koblitz [33] and Miller [34] . An elliptic curve F q is expressed over a non-singular cubic polynomial equation in the form of:
with the condition 4a 3 + 27b 2 (mod q) = 0 where q is a prime number and a, b are two unknowns over a field F q . Elliptic curves have the property that if a straight line that intersects the curve in two points is drawn, it will also intersect the curve in a third point that is either on the curve or the point of infinity. They use the property of elliptic curves to produce cryptographic algorithms which called Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The security of ECC depends on the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).
Theorem 1 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)): Given an elliptic curve E over a finite field F q . Let point P ∈ E F q , and suppose that P has a prime order n. Select an integer k at random from the interval [1, n − 1] and calculate point Q = kP. Given points P, Q ∈ P to find the integer k is called ECDLP and known to be computationally difficult.
B. ELLIPTIC CURVE ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION
Elgamal Cryptosystem was first described by Taher Elgamal in 1985 [35] . It can be described by a tuple of three algorithms as follows.
• Gen 1 λ → (pk, sk): it takes the security parameter λ as input, gets (G, q, g) by running G 1 λ , then randomly selects x ← Z q and computes h := g x . Finally it outputs public key pk = (G, q, g, h) and private key sk = x.
• Enc (pk, m) → c 1 , c 2 : it takes the public key pk = (G, q, g, h) and message m ∈ G as input, chooses a random y ← Z q , outputs the ciphertext c 1 , c 2 = g y , h y · m . • Dec (sk, c 1 , c 2 ) → m: it takes the private key sk = x and ciphertext c 1 , c 2 = g y , h y · m as input, outputs
Elliptic Curve ElGamal Encryption can be described as the analog of the Elgamal Cryptography and uses Elliptic Curve arithmetic over a finite field where multiplication operations replaced by addition and exponentiation replaced by multiplication. ECC ElGamal is more efficient than using a multiplicative group to implement ElGamal, because ElGamal requires a key length of 1024 bits, while ECC requires only a key length of 160 bits for the same security, which has greatly improved in terms of speed, power, bandwidth, storage, etc., and can be used as a lightweight public key encryption method, suitable for resource-constrained devices, such as wireless sensors in Internet of Things applications. ECC ElGamal Encryption [36] can be described by a tuple of three algorithms as follows.
• Gen 1 λ → (pk, sk): it takes the security parameter λ as input, gets an elliptic curve E(F q ) with a point P of prime order n by running G 1 λ , then randomly selects an integer s ← Z q and computes Q := [s] P. Finally it outputs public key pk = (E, q, P, Q) and private key sk = s.
• Enc (pk, M ) → c 1 , c 2 : it takes the public key pk = (E, q, P, Q) and as a point on E F q as input, chooses a random r ← Z q , outputs the ciphertext c 1 ,
C. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS

Definition 1 (Negligible Function):
If the function f (x) is negligible, it means that for any polynomial p(·), there always exists an N such that for all inputs x > N it holds f (x) < 1 p(x) , i.e., the function f (x) approaches zero.
Definition 2 (Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman (ECDDH)): Given an elliptic curve E over a finite field F q . Given P, aP, bP, Q ∈ E F q to determine if Q = abP where a, b are uniformly random from the interval [1, n − 1]. This problem is known to be computationally difficult.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we present the system model and security model of our scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The proposed LPEQ involves four types of entities: Key Generation Center, IoT Devices, Authorized Users and Edge Servers. The architecture of LPEQ is shown as FIGURE 1. A detailed introduction of these entities is given below.
1) Key Generation Center (KGC): trusted entity,
is responsible for the generation and distribution of public parameters and secret keys, including the master key and the secret key for IoT Devices, AU, and ES. These processes are performed offline. 2) IoT Devices: semi-trusted entity, is equipped with not only sensing capability but also communication capability, which can be regarded as the data owner, encrypts the sensed data locally and then periodically outsources the encryped data to the nearest edge server. 3) Edge Servers (ES): semi-trusted entity, is distributed physically close to the IoT Devices at the edge of the network with stronger communication, computation and storage capabilities. It is able to locally re-encrypt and store the data collected from the IoT domain, and if necessary, it deletes some historical data to continuously store new data. In addition, it can respond to the query request of AU in an almost real-time way. 4) Authorized Users (AU): semi-trusted entity, contains one or more users, is able to request data from ES. Before presenting the notion of our scheme, we first define some notations as listed in TABLE 2, which will be used in our following models and constructions. The notion of LPEQ is introduced and formalized in Definition 3.
Definition 3: LPEQ can be described by a tuple of seven algorithms. LPEQ = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, TokenGen, Query, Dec) 1) Setup 1 λ → (msk, params). The Setup algorithm is run by KGC. It takes as input a security parameter λ, outputs a master key msk and some public parameters params. The KGC publishes params and keeps msk secret.
Generation algorithm is also run by KGC. It takes as input msk, IoT Device's identity O i and AU's identity U j , outputs and forwards the secret key
The Encryption algorithm is run by IoT Devices. It takes as input params, IoT Device's secret key K O i , searchable plaintext index m, corresponding value v and a symmetric key K O i , outputs the encrypted index C i (m), the encrypted value v corresponding to index m as C i (v) and the encryption of symmetric key
The Re-encryption algorithm is run by ES. After
The TokenGen algorithm is run by AU. The AU takes as input params, his own secret key K U j and the index w to be queried, outputs the encrypted query index C j (w) and sends chal = (C j (w)) as the equality query challenge to ES. 6) Query params, chal,
The Query algorithm is run by ES. After receiving the equality query challenge chal sent by AU, the ES re-encrypts the challenge by K E U j and compares it with the index stored in DB. If it is valid, the ES partially decrypts all the corresponding re-encryption of symmetric key C i (k) as C i * (k), forwards the collection {C i * (k)} and the query results correction {C i (v)} to AU. Otherwise, the ES aborts.
The Decryption algorithm is run by AU. Taking the encrypted value collection {C i (v)}, symmetric key ciphertext collection {C i * (k)} and his own secret key K U j as input, AU obtains a collection of plaintext value v as {v}, i.e., the equality query results.
B. SECURITY MODEL
In the proposed system, we assume the KGC is trusted, that is, it will not be destroyed by malicious attackers, nor will it collude with other malicious entities. We assume other entities are semi-trusted and will not collude with each other, they will honestly perform the agreement but may try to get some information from it. For example, the ES is responsible for storing the ciphertext data of IoT Devices and helping AU retrieve the data. However, the ES may be curious about the outsourced data, or each IoT Device may be curious about the data of other IoT Devices, etc.
We define the security requirements for our LPEQ as (i) Data confidentiality: Unauthorized users cannot access the data, in addition, the data sent by each IoT Device should not be disclosed to ES or other unintended IoT Devices; (ii) Query privacy: ES cannot get any information about the query token and query results of AU. the Next, we build an IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack) security model to show that our scheme meets the security requirements.
Our scheme is considered to be secure means that without the data owner's secret key, it is hard for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary to extract the plaintext from the given ciphertext. In other words, ES or other unintended IoT Devices will not know any information about the data encrypted by IoT Device, and ES will not know any information about this query token encrypted by AU. The indistinguishability security is modeled by an interactive game played between a challenger and an adversary A. The challenger generates an encryption scheme, while the adversary tries to break the scheme.
To start, the challenger first generates some public parameters params and secret keys, sends params to the adversary and keeps msk secretly. The adversary can then make encryption queries on messages with the challenger's help. Finally, the adversary outputs two distinct messages for the challenger to choose one to encrypt, and guess which plaintext message the ciphertext corresponds to.
Formally, the security model of IND-CPA can be described as follows.
Setup: Challenger runs Setup 1 λ → (msk, params) and KeyGen msk, O i , U j → K O i , K U j , K E , sends the public parameters params to the adversary and keeps the secret keys secretly.
Phase 1: The adversary makes encryption queries on plaintexts that are adaptively chosen by the adversary itself in this phase. For an encryption query on the index m and the corresponding value v, the challenger runs Enc params,
) and then sends the encryption result to the adversary.
Challenge: The adversary outputs two distinct messages m 0 and m 1 from the same message space to be challenged. The challenger randomly flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and returns the challenge C * as C * = Enc params, The advantage ε of the adversary in winning this game is defined as ε = Pr b = b − 1 2 . Definition 4 (Indistinguishability): A LPEQ scheme is (t, ε)-secure in the IND-CPA security model if there exists no adversary who can win the above game with running time less than t with advantage more than ε.
IV. CONSTRUCTION
Inspired by ECC ElGamal, we designed LPEQ to achieve lightweight privacy-preserving equality query on the data outsourced by multiple IoT Devices in edge computingenvironment. LPEQ can be described by a tuple of seven algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, TokenGen, Query and Dec. The concrete working process of LPEQ is shown in FIGURE 2. The detailed construction of every algorithm is as follows. We use ⊕ to represent addition in ECC arithmetic and to represent negative addition.
1) Setup 1 λ → (msk, params). Given a security parameter λ, the KGC chooses an elliptic curve E over a finite field F q , and chooses point P ∈ E F q of prime order n. Then the KGC randomly chooses an integer s ∈ Z n * , sets msk = s as the master key, sets params = (E, q, P, ) as the public parameters, makes params public and keeps msk secret.
Given the identification O i of IoT Device and the identification U j of AU, KGC randomly chooses an integer r O i ∈ Z n * , sets K O i = r O i as the secret key and forwards K O i to IoT Device O i . KGC randomly chooses an integer r U j ∈ [1, n − 1], sets K U j = r U j and forwards K U j to AU U j . Besides, using master key msk, KGC computes secret keys for ES. KGC sets K E O i = msk K O i as the secret key of ES for IoT Device O i , sets K E U j = msk K U j as the secret key of ES for AU U j .
Finally, KGC securely forwards
The IoT Device O i encrypts the searchable plaintext index m with a common random integer r ∈ Z n * and its secret key K O i , and obtains C i (m) = rP, mP ⊕ rK O i P as the ciphertext. Then, randomly choose a point K O i ∈ E F q as the key of semantic secure symmetric encryption function f . The IoT Device utilizes
(v) and gets the encrypted data of v which corresponds to index m. Next, the IoT Device encrypts the symmetric key K O i utilizing its secret key K O i as C i (k) = rP, K O i ⊕ rK O i P , and finally forwards
The ES utilizes its secret key K E O i which corresponds to O i to re-encrypt C i (m) and C i (k). It computes C i (m) [2] ⊕ rK E O i P and C i (k) [2] ⊕ rK E O i P,
The AU U j first uses his own secret key K U j to encrypt the index w to be queried. The AU computes C j (w) = rP, wP ⊕ rK U j P and then sends chal = (C j (w)) as the equality query challenge to ES. 6) Query params, chal,
. After receiving chal sent by AU, the ES selects the secret key K E U j corresponding to AU U j to re-encrypt C j (w) and calculates C j (w) [2] ⊕ rK E U j P. The ES gets w = rP, wP ⊕ rK U j P ⊕ rK E U j P and compares in the database DB whether there exists C i (m) stored equal to w . If it exists, the ES then partially decrypts all the corresponding C i (k) of C i (m) satisfying the condition, computes C i (k) [2] rK E U j P, gets After receiving all the corresponding tuples, the AU U j decrypts all C i * (k) with his secret key K U j and gets
rK U j P. Then AU U j decrypts all C i (v) with K O i . Finally, he obtains a collection of plaintext v as {v}, which are the equality query results corresponding to the searchable index w.
A. CORRECTNESS
Now we show the correctness of LPEQ. If the KGC, the IoT Devices, the ES and the AU run all the algorithms described above correctly, we have
Meanwhile, we have
Then based on (2) and (3), we have
Finally, (5) can be derived as
Thus K O i is derived, the AU can use it to decrypt the query results.
V. SECURITY ANALYSES
We prove our LPEQ is secure in this section.
Theorem 2: LPEQ satisfies the security requirements under Definition 4.
Proof: The Security requirements can be formulated to prove that our LPEQ meets indistinguishability. First, we suppose there exists an efficient adversary A who can break the scheme in the IND-CPA security model. Besides, we construct an efficient simulator B to solve the ECDDH problem. We show that the probability of breaking the security of LPEQ under the game defined in Definition 4 is negligible.
• In Setup phase, the simulator B takes (E, q, P, P 1 , P 2 , Q)
as input, where P, P 1 , P 2 , Q ∈ E F q and P 1 = aP, P 2 = bP for some uniformly random a, b ∈ [1, n − 1]. Then B randomly chooses an element In what follows, we will show that this only happen with Succ ≤ 1 2 + negl (λ) based on two cases. Case 1: B takes Q = abP B randomly selects a, b, c ∈ Z q and sets P 1 := aP,
the first element in ciphertext, i.e., P 2 , is clearly independent to m b P ⊕ c bK O i P , will not reveal any information about m b . Therefore, A needs to distinguish between m 0 and m 1 without any additional information. Cause b is a uniform random selection, the output b and b will be independent, with the probability of 1 2 . So in this case we have
Case 2: B takes Q = abP B randomly selects a, b ∈ Z q and sets P 1 := aP, It is known to all that the ECDDH problem is computationally difficult, there must be a negligible function negl (λ) that satisfies
Therefore, the LPEQ scheme has indistinguishable encryption under chosen-plaintext attacks, thus the entity without secret key will not get any information about the plaintext. Therefore, our LPEQ satisfies the security requirements under Definition 4.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
In this section, we analyze the performance of our LPEQ and compare the computation cost and communication cost of our LPEQ with other previous schemes through numerical analysis and simulated experiments. Some notations used in this section are shown in TABLE 3.
A. COMPUTATION COST
Here we only evaluate the computation cost and compare the numerical analysis between ours and Ref. [22] , [25] , which support the equality query and have better functionalities than other related works. We summarize the result in TABLE 4.
Notes: 1) We perform this theoretical analysis of computation costs based on a single data owner/IoT Device uploading a single element. 2) We omit the time costs of generating symmetric keys and encrypting/decrypting the value using symmetric encryption algorithm, because it is the common operations in the compared schemes. 3) While Ref. [22] requires 1024-bit long keys, our LPEQ and Ref. [25] achieves equal security level using just 160-bit long keys. And while Ref. [22] requires 2048-bit long keys, our LPEQ and Ref. [25] achieves equal security level using just 224-bit. 4) In Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] , Query phase is jointly performed by the proxy and the cloud server, while in ours, it is only performed by the ES. Therefore, in our scheme, we do not consider the Query's computation cost of the cloud server. Analyses: 1) It can be seen from the theoretical analysis that the modular exponentiation on Z * q in Ref. [22] is replaced by the point doubling on E F q in our scheme and Ref. [25] , and the multiplication on Z * q in Ref. [22] is replaced by the point addition on E F q . Cause that the point doubling on E F q is much faster than the modular exponentiation on Z * q under the same security level, it is obvious that the Enc, ReEnc, Token-Gen and Dec algorithms in our scheme and Ref. [25] have less computation overhead when their coefficients of numerical analysis are the same as those in Ref. [22] . 2) Besides, although the computation costs of Enc, ReEnc and TokenGen algorithms are roughly similar to that of Ref. [25] , it is still obvious that our Query algorithm is more efficient than Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] .
In addition, requests can be processed more timely because they do not need to be forwarded to the cloud server.
B. COMMUNICATION COST
We evaluate the communication costs of our LPEQ, Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] , and summarize the result in TABLE 5. Notes: 1) We perform this theoretical analysis of communication costs based on a single data owner/IoT Device uploading a single element. 2) We calculate the bit length of the parameters sent by an entity to another one in each algorithm as the communication cost. The Dec algorithm ends up with the AU decrypting the data locally, so the Dec algorithm is not included in the following analysis. 3) While Ref. [22] requires 1024-bit long keys, our LPEQ and Ref. [25] achieve equal security level using just 160-bit long keys, and while Ref. [22] requires 2048-bit long keys, our LPEQ and Ref. [25] achieve equal security level using just 224-bit. Therefore, at the same security level, the size of one point of E F q in bits is smaller than the size of one element of G in bits. 4) In Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] , Query phase is jointly performed by the proxy and the cloud server, while it is only performed by the ES in our scheme. Therefore, we do not consider the communication cost of Query of the cloud server in our scheme. Analyses: 1) In the comparison of communication costs, cause that |P| is smaller than |G| at the same security level, it is obvious that Enc, ReEnc and TokenGen algorithms in ours and Ref. [25] have the smallest communication costs since the coefficients of numerical analysis are the same as those in Ref. [22] . 2) Besides, although the communication costs of Enc, ReEnc and TokenGen algorithms are roughly similar to that of Ref. [25] , it is still obvious that the communication cost of our Query algorithm is less than Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] .
C. SIMULATIONS
We give detailed simulations between our LPEQ, Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] . Our experiments were conducted using Java on a laptop PC with a 3.4GHz Intel Core i7-6700 CPU and 8GB of RAM. All the experimental results were obtained from the average value of 20 trails. Notes: 1) In order to facilitate comparison of computation costs, we tested the value of |n| for 4 bytes, 8 bytes, 16 bytes, 32 bytes, 64 bytes and 128 bytes respectively. 2) To ensure the same security level, we select 2048-bit long keys for Ref. [22] and 224-bit long keys for our LPEQ (using NIST_P_224) and Ref. [25] for comparison. 3) Since the Setup algorithm is completed offline by the trusted KGC, the cost of Setup is not tested here. 4) Meanwhile, since the execution entity of Query algorithm in our scheme is different from that in Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] , we can get the comparison in numerical analysis so we have not simulated that. We only simulated the comparison on computation costs of Enc, ReEnc, TokenGen and Dec. 5) After comparing with Ref. [22] and Ref. [25] , we also performed several tests on each algorithm of our LPEQ under other parameter standards to better demonstrate the efficiency, which based on NIST_P_192, NIST_P_256, NIST_P_384 and NIST_P_521. 6) In order to show that our LPEQ is practical for applications in edge computing, we finally performed several tests on the efficiency of its application on big data. We select 10 5 to 10 6 elements of 4 bytes, 16 bytes and 64 bytes, respectively, and tested the computation costs of Enc, ReEnc, TokenGen, Query and Dec based on NIST_P_224. Analyses: 1) FIGURE 3 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for Enc. The X-label denotes the size of element outsourced and the Y-label denotes the time cost (millisecond) for encrypting each element. Our Enc phase is roughly the same as that in Ref. [25] and completely faster than that of Ref. [22] especially when each element size is smaller than 128 bytes. It is not difficult to find that the computation cost of our Enc phase increases with the increasing of element size, and the computation cost of Ref. [22] tends to be close to constant. This is because we need to calculate mP in our Enc phase, which is a point doubling computation. So with the size of m increases, the computation cost will be larger. However, in practice, we do not need large size elements as the searchable index to outsource, our cost is still smaller than that of Ref. [22] at most time. Thus our solution is efficient enough. 2) FIGURE 4 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for ReEnc. The X-label denotes the size of element to be re-encrypted and the Y-label denotes the time cost (millisecond) for re-encrypting each element. It is obvious that our LPEQ and Ref. [25] are faster, about 10 milliseconds, independent to the size of element. 3) FIGURE 5 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for TokenGen. The X-label denotes the size of element to be queried and the Y-label denotes the time cost (millisecond) for generating the query token. It is obvious that the TokenGen phase of Ref. [25] and ours is completely faster than that of Ref. [22] when the element size is smaller than 128 bytes. This is similar to the Enc phase, we need to calculate wP in our TokenGen phase, which is also a point doubling computation. So our TokenGen computation cost becomes larger with the increase of the size of w. And w is not very large as well in the practical application scenario. Thus, our TokenGen phase still has advantages and is more efficient in practice. 4) FIGURE 6 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for Dec. The X-label denotes the size of element to be decrypted and the Y-label denotes the time cost (millisecond) for decrypting each element. It is obvious that our LPEQ and Ref. [25] are faster, about 8 milliseconds, independent to the size of element. 5) FIGURE 7 (a)-(d) illustrates the comparison on computation costs for each algorithm in our LPEQ when the elliptic curve parameters are different. The X-label denotes the size of element to be operated and the Y-label denotes the time cost (millisecond). Here we additionally test the computational overhead of the Query algorithm, it shows that Query is the same as ReEnc and Dec, independent of |n|. Besides, it is obvious that the smaller the size of element, the smaller the computation costs of each phase. We can find that as the key parameter of the elliptic curve becomes longer, the computation costs of each phase also increase. However, they are still very efficient and practical even we choose the NIST_P_521. 6) FIGURE 8 (a)-(c) illustrates the comparison on computation costs for each algorithm in our LPEQ when the size and number of elements are different. The X-label denotes the number of elements to be operated and the Y-label denotes the time cost (second). Obviously, the time cost of each algorithm increases with the number of element. Besides, it is obvious that ReEnc and Dec are very efficient and they are not affected by the size of each element. In addition, we can find that the costs of Enc and TokenGen are only about 10 4 seconds even when testing 10 6 elements of 64 bytes. Actually, in real-world scenarios, the size and the number of elements processed by the IoT device and edge server in a timely manner may not as large as we tested. Thus our LPEQ is well performed in big data and suitable enough for practical edge computing applications.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a lightweight and privacypreserving equality query scheme in edge computing, namely LPEQ, which adopts Elliptic Curve ElGamal Encryption to provide high efficiency in computation and communication.
Meanwhile, we designed a tuple of algorithms for LPEQ, by which the authorized users can perform privacy-preserving equality query on the encrypted data outsourced by multiple IoT Devices. Furthermore, we introduced a formal security model and proved the privacy-preserving properties of LPEQ under this model. Moreover, our theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations demonstrate that our LPEQ per-forms better efficiency in computation and communication while retaining privacy-preserving properties. Therefore, it is practical for applications in edge computing. In future work, we will study lightweight privacy-preserving schemes for other query types in edge computing. 
